Tactics Trireme

1 tactics

1.1 on-board forces
1.2 naval strategy in peloponnesian war
1.3 casualties

tactics

in ancient world, naval combat relied on 2 methods: boarding , ramming. artillery in form of ballistas , catapults widespread, in later centuries, inherent technical limitations meant not play decisive role in combat. method boarding brush alongside enemy ship, oars drawn in, in order break enemy s oars , render ship immobile, finished off convenient.

rams (embolon) fitted prows of warships, , used rupture hull of enemy ship. preferred method of attack come in astern, aim not of creating single hole, of rupturing big length of enemy vessel possible. speed necessary successful impact depended on angle of attack; greater angle, lesser speed required. @ 60 degrees, 4 knots enough penetrate hull, while increased 8 knots @ 30 degrees. if target reason in motion in direction of attacker, less speed required, , if hit came amidships. athenians became masters in art of ramming, using light, un-decked (aphraktai) triremes.

in either case, masts , railings of ship taken down prior engagement reduce opportunities opponents grappling hooks.

on-board forces

unlike naval warfare of other eras, boarding enemy ship not primary offensive action of triremes. triremes small size allowed limited number of marines carried aboard. during 5th , 4th centuries, trireme s strength in maneuverability , speed, not armor or boarding force. said, fleets less confident in ability ram prone load more marines onto ships.

on deck of typical trireme in peloponnesian war there 4 or 5 archers , 10 or marines. these few troops peripherally effective in offensive sense, critical in providing defense oarsmen. should crew of trireme board, marines stood between enemy troops , slaughter of men below. has been recorded if battle take place in calmer water of harbor, oarsmen join offensive , throw stones (from stockpile aboard) aid marines in harassing/attacking other ships.

naval strategy in peloponnesian war

a schematic view of circular kyklos formation have looked above.

squadrons of triremes employed variety of tactics. periplous (gk., sailing around ) involved outflanking or encircling enemy attack them in vulnerable rear; diekplous (gk., sailing out through ) involved concentrated charge break hole in enemy line, allowing galleys break through , wheel attack enemy line behind; , kyklos (gk., circle ) , mēnoeidēs kyklos (gk. half-circle ; literally, moon-shaped (i.e. crescent-shaped) circle ), defensive tactics employed against these manoeuvres. in of these manoeuvres, ability accelerate faster, row faster, , turn more sharply 1 s enemy important.

athens strength in peloponnesian war came navy, whereas sparta s came land-based hoplite army. war progressed spartans came realize if undermine pericles strategy of outlasting peloponnesians remaining within walls of athens indefinitely (a strategy made possible athens long walls , fortified port of piraeus), going have athens superior naval force. once sparta gained persia ally, had funds necessary construct new naval fleets necessary combat athenians. sparta able build fleet after fleet, destroying athenian fleet @ battle of aegospotami. spartan general brasidas summed difference in approach naval warfare between spartans , athenians: athenians relied on speed , maneuverability on open seas ram @ clumsier ships; in contrast, peloponnesian armada might win when fought near land in calm , confined waters, had greater number of ships in local theater, , if better-trained marines on deck , hoplites on shore turn sea battle contest of infantry. in addition, compared high-finesse of athenian navy (superior oarsmen outflank , ram enemy triremes side), spartans (as allies , other enemies of athens) focus on ramming athenian triremes head on. these tactics, in combination outlined brasidas, led defeat of athenian fleet @ second battle of syracuse during sicilian expedition.

casualties

once naval battle underway, men involved, there numerous ways them meet end. drowning perhaps common way crew member perish. once trireme had been rammed, ensuing panic engulfed men trapped below deck no doubt extended amount of time took men escape. inclement weather decrease crew s odds of survival, leading situation off cape athos in 411 (12 of 10,000 men saved). estimated 40,000 persians died in battle of salamis. in peloponnesian war, after battle of arginusae, 6 athenian generals executed failing rescue several hundred of men clinging wreckage in water.

if men did not drown, might taken prisoner enemy. in peloponnesian war, captured crews brought ashore , either cut down or maimed - grotesquely, cutting off right hand or thumb guarantee never row again. image found on early-5th-century black-figure, depicting prisoners bound , thrown sea being pushed , prodded under water poles , spears, shows enemy treatment of captured sailors in peloponnesian war brutal. being speared amid wreckage of destroyed ships common cause of death sailors in peloponnesian war.

naval battles far more of spectacle hoplite battles on land. battles raging @ sea watched thousands of spectators on shore. along greater spectacle, came greater consequences outcome of given battle. whereas average percentage of fatalities land battle between 10-15%, in sea battle, forces engaged ran risk of losing entire fleet. number of ships , men in battles high. @ battle of arginusae example, 263 ships involved, making total of 55,000 men, , @ battle of aegospotami more 300 ships , 60,000 seamen involved. in battle of aegospotami, city-state of athens lost left of navy: once invincible thalassocracy lost 170 ships (costing 400 talents), , majority of crews either killed, captured or lost.